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Abstract
In this analysis the author sets out to examine the concept of freedom of speech 
on the internet, drawing upon the development of the World Wide Web, the 
Big-Data-Trade-Off-Dilemma and the nothing-to-hide argument fallacy. A key 
finding is the observation of a multitude of emerging challenges in the field of 
ethics, privacy, law and security. Furthermore the most recent exertion of influ-
ence on the freedom of speech, that is to say astroturfing should adduce as an 
instance to demonstrate the possibilities of manipulating public opinion. Fur-
ther on, the analysis of governmental military enhancement programmes and 
the example of a recent entertainment programme production shall serve as 
a visualisation that the research on unprecedented signal resolution and data-
transfer bandwidth between the brain and electronics might be far more close 
to reality than one might be expecting. The results suggest that the freedom 
of speech is preceded by the freedom of thinking. Its manipulation on a bigger 
scale (e.g. national elections) could serve as a new way of psychological warfare 
and therefore the freedom of thinking, or the right to a free mind should remain 
unviolated.
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“Laws and ethics can’t keep pace with technology” (Wadhwa, 2014). The 
internet, originally conceived in the 1960s and developed in the 1980s as 
a scientific network for exchanging information, was not designed for the 
purpose of separating information flows (Michener, 1999). The Word Wide 
Web as we know it was not foreseen, neither was the evolution of ways in 
how we access it. Developments over recent years have each created new 
ethical and legal challenges, e.g. the discussion around the use of cook-
ies (Palmer, 2005), the “like” button (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009), cloud 
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computing (Ruiter & Warnier, 2011), and the interactive web, known as 
Web 2.0, where users generate much of the content themselves. 
In increasing numbers, devices other than smartphones, such as 
watches, refrigerators and cars, that are not limited to user-owned com-
puting devices, will be connected to the internet, containing chips and/or 
connected in the so-called Internet of Things. 
DeNardis (2014) notes that individuals using a social media platform 
or smartphone app may have the impression that their online activities 
are private, but in practice, much more information is collected, some of 
which is not related to content but to associated information to identify 
the user in an administrative and logistical way. Some services collect in-
formation as device information, including unique hardware identifiers, 
mobile phone number (if accessing the internet from a phone), IP address, 
time and date of phone calls, actual location based on GPS, Wi-Fi, or cellu-
lar signal from a mobile device. Above all, it seems pertinent to remember 
that some of this information might not necessarily be needed to provide 
a particular service. Following the line of argument by DeNardis, the gath-
ering and sharing of data about individuals is at the heart of both online 
advertising and new forms of government surveillance or, to put it another 
way, we are facing a situation that Gallagher (2014, p. 5) calls “multiveil-
lance”, which is surveillance not just by the state but also by companies, 
marketers, and those in our social networks. 
The most compelling argument within the Big Data discourse is that 
the user has become the product and is not the customer any more. Al-
though those who are involved in the “free software movement” advo-
cate for “free” as in free speech (Latin: libre) rather than “free” as in free 
beer (Latin: gratis), what has occurred in practice, and is still taking place, 
is a supremacy of software as free as in free beer. The public does not feel 
that they are paying for the use of social media platforms: Facebook or 
Twitter, or internet search engines such as Google, Yahoo!, or Bing. Pro-
vided that maintaining those services costs a lot of money and provided 
that anything can become something of value, one could conclude that not 
only has personal data become the currency the user is paying those ser-
vices with, but also “the world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, 
but data” (Regulating, 2017), the fuel of the future.
We see that there is a transformation from ad valorem to gratis soft-
ware, which still is an ongoing process and which makes it difficult to 
draw definite conclusions. With this in mind, let us look at the possible 
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motivations that make people put themselves in an exposed position on 
the internet. In order to understand these motivations, which may only 
be limited to assumptions, we need first to understand which information 
people think is available about themselves online. In light of the evidence 
from a survey entitled Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online (Rainie, 
Kiesler, Kang & Madden, 2013), we have a better understanding of what 
adult internet users say which information about them is available online. 
Thus, 66% of them think it is “a photo of you”, 50% think it is their birth 
date, followed by general information such as home address, phone num-
ber and the company one works for. 
If things were only that simple. Consider for a moment the records that 
Google has of your searches you did on the internet: records of your won-
derings, musings, and fantasies. Think of the records your e-mail provider 
has of your communications, or a cloud company has of your documents. 
Consider the (machine learning) algorithms behind all those services that 
make them improve with every input by every internet user. 
Although the possibilities of the internet to keep in touch with one an-
other are very convenient, think for a moment about the records social 
networks hold concerning their users. Possible motivations in addition to 
usefulness could be derived from an evolutionary point of view. Human 
beings are by nature social animals. In other words, it may appear con-
venient to have all of your contacts within shouting distance, that is, not 
too far away, but also not too close. Psychologically speaking, one could 
assume that some people might fear that they will not exist if they do not 
have an online identity, since studies (Ong et al., 2011) suggest a link be-
tween narcissism, extraversion and adolescents’ self-presentation on so-
cial media platforms. Furthermore, there is evidence to support this theory 
considering the ingenious methods how social media platforms remind 
their users on a constant basis to “complete” their profiles, which basically 
is nothing more than adding more personal information. 
Another key point to remember is that social media services tend to-
wards the creation of an allegedly wholesome shell of positivity, where 
users get to express themselves by liking something and others receiving 
those likes, which is a manufactured mutual win-win situation by default, 
considering that there was and is no “dislike” button. Recently, Facebook 
users got upgraded from expressing one emotion up to 6 basic emotions, 
in addition to the “like” button there now is “love”, “haha”, “wow”, “sad” 
and “angry”. Similar to the limitation of expression in order to keep the 
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atmosphere positive, the idea of an ideal online world is kept alive by, for 
example, only notifying users that they have gained a new friend, but not 
if they have lost one. 
Users have to accept the terms and conditions of services and have 
to give permission to the apps on their mobile devices so they may use its 
camera, storage or microphone. Studies confirm that people tend to ac-
cept the terms of service without actually reading them (Obar & Oeldorf-
Hirsch, 2018). The results of this study suggest that there may be a diver-
gence between in-depth knowledge and an ambiguous sciolism of what 
actually is happening with the user’s data. 
Then again, there is the nothing-to-hide argument. Why bother if one 
has nothing to hide? One could ask these people if they have curtains in 
their homes. If they do, one could ask them why, since they have nothing 
to hide. 
The problem with the nothing-to-hide argument is the underlying as-
sumption that privacy is about hiding bad things. This biased use of the 
term “privacy” which is so often used interchangeably with the term “se-
crecy” may be a cause for the misconception that having nothing to hide is 
not the same as not having anything one feels they need to show someone 
else, either. 
Significantly, there is a desire to remain anonymous on the internet 
and as one study (Rainie, Kiesler, Kang & Madden, 2013) suggests: 33% of 
adult internet users say they have used the internet in way to avoid be-
ing observed by hackers or criminals, followed by 28% who were trying 
to avoid advertisers, while only 5% were trying to avoid the government. 
Another study with the programmatic title Why do people seek anonym-
ity on the internet? (Kang, Brown & Kiesler, 2013) finds that the third big-
gest group of interviewees seeks anonymity in order to share art or work, 
while the second smallest group is engaged in discussing, or is involved in 
politics. 
With this in mind, one could theorise that people who try to share art 
anonymously or discuss certain topics are not looking for the “dopamine 
high”, which social media triggers when people get likes for sharing con-
tent. As studies suggest that reward differs with respect to social networks, 
a study entitled Social network modulation of reward-related signals sug-
gests that reward valuation in social contexts is sensitive to the distinctions 
of social networks, such that sharing positive experiences with in-network 
others may carry higher value (Fareri, Niznikiewicz, Lee & Delgado, 2012).
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
Freedom of speech on the internet may be a benefit for citizens living in 
oppressive states. Moreover, during the Middle East uprisings in 2011 that 
would later be called the “Arab Spring”, media outlets around the globe 
became captivated with the personal blog postings of Amina Abdallah Ar-
raf. The freedom of writing one’s opinion on the internet not only can be 
a benefit in favour of free press (free as in libre), but also bears the danger 
of getting away with anonymously posted denigrative statements thrown 
at some person, or even the manufacturing of public opinion on a large 
scale known as “astroturfing”. This is achieved through anonymous inter-
net comments, stories or websites that promote misinformation in an at-
tempt to sway consumer opinion or behaviour. There are many points in 
support of illustrating this phenomenon. Firstly, this could be an author 
who writes online critiques of their own books. Secondly, it could be a res-
taurant-owner who writes positive reviews of their own restaurant, prob-
ably knowing that a one percent increase in the reputation score can bring 
about a half percent increase in occupancy and about a one and a half per-
cent increase in revenue (Anderson, 2012). Thirdly, it could be the news 
which, in theory, can be manipulated and with governments seeming to 
have realised that forming public opinion may be one of the most power-
ful information weapons of the 21st century. However, let us take a step 
back – perhaps this does not concern freedom of speech but freedom of 
thought. 
Bypassing the question of who should be in control, or whether there 
should be a controlling instance at all, one should notice the fact that be-
fore we engage with specific arguments for limiting free speech, we are in 
fact free to speak as we like. As a consequence, freedom of speech is dif-
ferent from some other types of free action. 
If someone, such as the government, wants to prevent citizens engag-
ing in certain actions – riding bicycles, for instance – it can do so by a mul-
titude of restrictions. It can make sure that bicycles are no longer available, 
all existing bicycles could be burned and a ban could be placed on future 
imports. Freedom of speech is somehow a different case. Although one 
could limit the access to forms of free expression by banning books, plays 
and films, it is beyond one’s area of authority, as well as even the possibili-
ty to make it impossible to say certain things. The only thing a government 
could do in such case would be to punish people after they have spoken. 
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In this line of argumentation we are, in fact, free to say anything we 
like. We do not necessarily have to publish it (write it on the internet), as 
some institution can make that freedom more or less costly to exercise. 
Following this line of reasoning, one may conclude that in order to pre-
vent someone who has no fear of punishment from making use of their 
freedom of speech, one would have to remove their vocal chords. Hence, 
to prevent someone from exercising their freedom of thought, one would 
have to remove their brain. It appears that forming, influencing and direct-
ing public opinion, which in a way amounts to the same thing as to not let 
people think freely in the first place, seems the least drastic option while 
probably also being more cost effective than the former two options. 
To give an illustration of what I mean, let us take a look at an episode 
of the British science fiction anthology series Black Mirror, entitled Hat-
ed in the Nation. In the near future, extinct bees have been replaced by 
robotic equivalents to maintain the balance of the ecosystem. Equipped 
with sensors and a script (a sequence of instructions) that is executed by 
a processor inside the bees, they autonomously fulfil their task nature has 
given them a priori. The government has planted a back door in the code 
(just in case) and the whole system is managed from one centralised head-
quarters. A social media movement arises where people use the hashtag 
“#DeathTo” adding the name and a picture of a someone slated for death, 
thereby giving vent to their hate of that particular person, who usually is 
some public figure that has become unpopular by not following the public 
code of behaviour. After 5 p.m., when the “polls” close, the person hated 
the most, namely he or she possessing the most-frequently mentioned 
name and that particular hashtag, gets attacked by a bee in an invasive 
manner and which makes its way into the brain of the victim, causing such 
agony that eventually leads to suicide. In the next step, the algorithm, after 
taking control of law enforcement, goes into a second phase, that is to say 
punishes all the people that had ever taken part in this social media activ-
ity (meaning they have posted #DeathTo, a name and a picture) by turn-
ing the bees against them, resulting in a multitude of deaths, thereby 
adding a moral value to the whole narrative. 
Coupled with ingenious bits of multilayered social commentary, as well 
as the theoretical possibility of such a scenario occurring by considering 
the status of current information technology and medical research, this 
episode constitutes a good example in order to elaborate on the dangers 
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emerging from “Bridging the Bio-Electronic Divide” (see also Bridging the 
Bio-Electronic Divide, 2016). At this point a brief excursus is required. 
“BRIDGING THE BIO-ELECTRONIC DIVIDE”
Modern efforts at “military human enhancement” draw on the fields of 
neuroscience, biology, genetics, pharmacology, nanotechnology and robot-
ics. The Pentagon’s high-tech Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is well on the way to developing a number of prosthetic projects 
aimed at producing super soldiers. According to Lin, Mehlman & Abney 
(2013) one may divide the research on enhancement into physical capa-
bilities, cognitive capabilities, senses, metabolism and a miscellany of dual-
use research applications. Neurowarfare may be defined as warfare using 
“neuroweapons” that are designed to specifically target the brain or the 
central nervous system in order to affect the targeted person’s mental 
state, mental capacity and, ultimately, the person’s behaviour in a specific 
and predictable way. Psychiatry is inter alia based on the assumption that 
mental states and behaviour can be regulated or controlled with pharma-
ceuticals. The US military, for instance, had already become interested in 
“psycho-chemical warfare” back in the late 1940s. Nowadays, neuroscien-
tific enhancement stands at the forefront of DARPA’s research, including 
non-invasive and invasive brain stimulation, such as: brain-computer in-
terfaces, brainwave entrainment, transcranial magnetic stimulation, intra-
cortical microstimulation, transcranial direct current stimulation, and deep 
brain stimulation. Thus, by “Bridging the Bio-Electronic Divide” and with 
every intervention and every observation concerning every human brain, 
we confront a multitude of ethical issues. The moral questions related 
to “Bridging the Bio-Electronic Divide” concern its use as a method for 
modern warfare. The moral dimension has at least two different angles: 
(1) where does the human end and the technological begin, or what is ex-
terior to the body of the soldier and what is interior; and (2) in which ways 
may the cross-linking between biological and electromagnetic enhance-
ment potentiate the already existing “psychological” methods, such as 
political warfare, “psywar”, institutional conflict and psychosocial combat 
using the great potentiality of television and the internet, all of whose pri-
mary purpose is to disorient and disarm the opposition and bear the po-
tential to blow a state up from within. In the future, the battlefield should 
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be expected to shift progressively into the intellectual realm, impacting 
on the consciousness and feelings of many millions of people. New con-
flicts may no longer be wars only among people but wars of artificial intel-
ligence and the equipment and virtual reality created by this kind of in-
telligence. There is a good case to believe that neurowarfare is likely to 
extend over many decades with the distinction between peace and war 
becoming not just blurred, but meaningless. The effects of combining 
“Bridging the Bio-Electronic Divide” with information weapons (e.g. mass 
media and cyber weapons) may derive – if circumstances so require – new 
research in neurosecurity as neuroethics. Although such weapon systems 
may be considered as dangerous as nuclear weapons, they will probably 
be more acceptable in terms of political and military ideology.
CONCLUSION
The trouble with all these developments is that one cannot go back. We 
are engaged in a grand social experiment, the outcome of which we can 
only guess at. Above all, we should keep in mind that the “smarter” our 
technology gets, the bigger the attack surface grows, considering all the 
multiple emerging side branches which every technological evolutionary 
step contains. 
Human organisms are susceptible to infections and so are software-
controlled machines, which can be infected by a virus, for instance. The 
underlying mechanism is the same, meaning a virus needs a host to repli-
cate itself. 
Although it seems natural to suggest that all technology should be 
used in moderation and in a reasonable way, there is one essential “inter-
ference factor”, namely emotions. According to Phelps, Lempert & Sokol-
Hessner (2014), the prevalent view of emotion and decision making is de-
rived from the notion that there are dual systems of emotion and reason. 
Making a decision often occurs in the face of uncertainty about whether 
one’s choices will lead to benefit or harm. By contrast, the somatic marker 
hypothesis is a neurobiological theory of how decisions are made in the 
face of uncertain outcomes. This theory holds that such decisions are aided 
by emotions, in the form of bodily states, that are elicited during the delib-
eration of future consequences and that mark different options for behav-
iour as being advantageous or disadvantageous. This process involves an 
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interplay between neural systems that elicit emotional/bodily states and 
neural systems that map these emotional/bodily states. 
DISCUSSION
We have seen that the internet was not designed to become the World 
Wide Web as we know it. Furthermore, we have mentioned the Big-Da-
ta-Trade-Off-Dilemma (the user trades his personal data for services or 
what is more, “becomes” the product eventually) and looked for possible 
explanations for the mindless spreading of personal data on the internet. 
However, there are tendencies where users seek privacy. Having said that, 
we have tried to deconstruct the nothing-to-hide argument fallacy. Yet 
the marketing divisions of Big Data corporations are doing a good job in 
appealing for the emotions of the users. The continuous development of 
something that cannot be turned off for maintenance (the internet) can be 
compared with replacing the engines of an airplane while flying. This con-
tinuous development makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions. With 
this in mind, we are constantly facing a multitude of new challenges in the 
field of ethics, privacy, law and security. 
We have been discussing the differences between freedom of speech 
in contrast to the freedom of other actions (riding a bicycle in this case) and 
possible sanctions. In view of the lack of possibilities to control freedom of 
speech, which is preceded by freedom of thought, we have demonstrated 
possibilities of influencing public opinion. Importantly, since “Bridging the 
Bio-Electronic Divide” is no dystopian science fiction scenario but a poten-
tial development of the near future, further research in robot ethics and 
safeguarding of the emerging “smart” devices is needed. We have tried to 
link the feasible dangers emerging from the ingenious but malicious mis-
use of social media in connection with a hijacked centralised system by 
using the example of a contemporary and popular science fiction series.
In conclusion, it may be beneficial to educate the public as to what 
data is actually processed while using allegedly free (as in beer) services, 
since human beings may be susceptible to Alzheimer’s disease, but the in-
ternet is not. Furthermore, the evident misconception of the discussion 
around the term “privacy” should be enlightened, since it should be treat-
ed in a neutral way, provided that studies suggest that the care for privacy 
is negatively connoted. The whole conception of privacy gains momentum 
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if we consider the possible ways of manipulating public opinion (e.g. astro-
turfing or military psychological warfare). 
All things considered, privacy is not something one should not care 
about because one has nothing to hide but “privacy is the right to a free 
mind” (Snowden, Chomsky & Greenwald, 2016).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, C. (2012). The impact of social media on lodging performance. Cornell Hospitality 
Report, 12(15), 6-11.
Bridging the Bio-Electronic Divide. (2016). Retrieved February 13, 2018, from https://www.
darpa.mil/news-events/2015-01-19
DeNardis, L. (2014). The Global War for Internet Governance. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press.
Fareri, D. S., Niznikiewicz, M. A., Lee, V. K., & Delgado M. R. (2012). Social network modulation 
of reward-related signals. The Journal of Neuroscience: the Official Journal of the Society 
for Neuroscience, 32(26), 9045-9052. 
Gallagher, K. (2014). Astroturfing: 21st Century False Advertising. Retrieved October 14, 2018, 
from http://www.anniesearle.com/web-services/Documents/ResearchNotes/ASARe-
searchNote_2014-12_Gallagher_Astroturfing.pdf
Kang, R., Brown, S., & Kiesler, S. (2013). Why do people seek anonymity on the internet?: in-
forming policy and design. In W. Mackay, S. Brewster, & S. Bødker (Eds.), CHI ‘13 Proceed-
ings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 2657-2666). 
New York: ACM.
Krishnamurthy, B., & Wills C. E. (2009). On the leakage of personally identifiable information 
via online social networks. In A. Sala, A. Goel, & K. Gummadi (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd 
ACM workshop on online social networks (pp. 7-12). New York: ACM.
Lin, P., Mehlman, M., & Abney, K. (2013, January). Enhanced Warfighters: Risks, Ethics, and 
Policy. Retrieved October 14, 2018, from http://ethics.calpoly.edu/greenwall_report.pdf
Michener, J. (1999). System insecurity in the Internet age. IEEE Software, 16(4), 62-69.
Obar, J. A., & Oeldorf-Hirsch, A. (2018, June). The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the 
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services. Retrieved Oc-
tober 14, 2018, from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757465
Ong, E. Y. L., Ang, R. P., Ho, J. C. M., Lim, J. C. Y., Goh, D. H., & Lee, C. S. (2011). Narcissism, 
extraversion and adolescents’ self-presentation on Facebook. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 50(2), 180-185. 
Palmer, D. E. (2005). Pop-ups, Cookies, and Spam: Toward a Deeper Analysis of the Ethical 
Significance of Internet Marketing Practices. Journal of Business Ethics, 58(1-3), 271-280.
Phelps, E., Lempert, K. M., & Sokol-Hessner, P. (2014). Emotion and Decision Making: Multiple 
Modulatory Neural Circuits. Annual Review of Neuroscience. 37, 264-287.
Rainie, L., Kiesler, S., Kang, R., & Madden, M. (2013). Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online. 
Retrieved October 14, 2018, from http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-
privacy-and-security-online/
Regulating the internet giants: The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but 
data. (2017, May 6). The Economist. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/news/
145#DeathToFreedomOfSpeech
leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-
valuable-resource?fsrc=scn/tw/te/rfd/pe
Ruiter, J., & Warnier, M. (2011). Privacy Regulations for Cloud Computing: Compliance and 
Implementation in Theory and Practice. In S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. de Hert, & R. Leenes 
(Eds.), Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice (pp. 361-376). 
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Snowden, E., Chomsky, N., & Greenwald, G. (2016, March 25). Snowden, Chomsky, and 
Greenwald discuss privacy, at 35:21 [Recorded panel discussion]. Tucson: University of 
Arizona College of Behavioral Sciences. Retrieved February 13, 2018, from https://vimeo.
com/160952562
Wadhwa, V. (2014, April 15). Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology. MIT Technol-
ogy Review. Retrieved from https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-eth-
ics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/
